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Individual Criminal
Responsibility for the
Destruction of Religious and
Historic Buildings: The Al Mahdi
Case
Milena Sterio*
Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, also known as Abou
Tourab, was a member of the radical Islamic group
Ansar Eddine, serving as one of four commanders
during its brutal occupation of Timbuktu in 2012.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted Al
Mahdi on several charges of war crimes, for
intentional attacks against ten religious and
historic buildings and monuments. All the buildings
which Al Mahdi was charged with attacking had
been under UNESCO protection, and most had
been listed as world heritage sites.
The case against Al Mahdi at the ICC unfolded
relatively quickly and efficiently, from the official
Malian referral of the case to the ICC until the end
of the trial when the defendant, who had pled guilty,
was sentenced. Al Mahdi’s initial arrest caught
many by surprise. While he was detained in a prison
in Niger, ICC authorities issued a sealed warrant
for his arrest, sent representatives to meet with
Niger government officials, and transferred him to
the ICC detention facility at The Hague. In addition,
Al Mahdi’s arrest and prosecution at the ICC have
sparked controversy because of the court’s decision
to pursue a little-known defendant for a relatively
insignificant crime. Others, however, have
applauded the ICC’s prosecution of Al Mahdi as a
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victory for the institution and a ground-breaking
legal precedent. This article analyzes the Al Mahdi
case and argues that his conviction will not only
constitute an important precedent for the ICC, but
also contribute toward the tribunal’s overall
legitimacy.
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I. Introduction and Factual Background
Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, also known as Abou Tourab, was a
member of the radical Islamic group Ansar Eddine, a Malian armed
jihadist group linked to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).1 Al
Mahdi was born in a city called Agoune, approximately 100 kilometers
west of Timbuktu in Mali.2 Al Mahdi served as head of the Islamic
Police in Timbuktu, and was one of the four commanders of Ansar
Eddine during its brutal occupation of Timbuktu in 2012.3 A Tuareg
armed rebellion erupted in the north of Mali in January 2012, when the
so-called National Liberation Movement of Azawad launched an
offensive.4 Other Islamist groups present in the geographic area,
including Ansar Eddine, quickly joined the offensive.5 Various hostilities
took place during this time, most in flagrant violation of international
1. Q & A: The Al Mahdi case at the ICC, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS: WORLDWIDEMOVEMENT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Aug. 17. 2016),
https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/mali/q-a-the-al-mahdi-case-at-the-
icc [http://perma.cc/5V4A-XYXD] [hereinafter WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT].
2. Id.
3. Id.; see also The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, No. ICC-01/12-
01/15, Warrant of Arrest, ¶ 7 (Sept. 18 2015), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc2068383.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q23L-XZ73]
[hereinafter Al Mahdi Arrest Warrant].
4. See Baz Lacocq & Greg Klute, Tuareg Separatism in Mali, 68 INT’L J. 424
(2012-2013) (describing Tuareg history, the offensive launched in 2012, and
the resulting insurgencies in the region).
5. WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT, supra note 1.
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humanitarian law.6 Several northern cities were captured by the
rebelling groups from early April 2012 until January 2013, when French
and Malian troops intervened to suppress the rebellion.7 Between June
2012 and July 2012, Timbuktu came under the control of Ansar Eddine
and another Islamist group.8 During this time, Al Mahdi worked closely
with the leaders of all the armed groups in the area, and, according to
the allegations asserted against Al Mahdi, played an active role in the
occupation of Timbuktu.9
The International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted Al Mahdi on
several charges of war crimes, specifically intentional attacks against
ten religious and historic buildings and monuments.10 Article 8.2(e)(iv)
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides that
war crimes include “intentionally directing attacks against buildings
dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes,
historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded
are collected, provided they are not military objectives.”11 All the
buildings which Al Mahdi was charged with attacking had been under
UNESCO protection, and most had been listed as world heritage sites.12
The Al Mahdi case at the ICC unfolded relatively quickly and
efficiently, from the official Malian referral of the case to the ICC until
the end of the Al Mahdi trial.13 The Malian government itself referred
the situation in Mali to the court in 2012.14 The Office of the Prosecutor
(OTP) then opened an official investigation into alleged crimes
committed in Mali in January 2013, and in February 2013, the Malian
government and the ICC signed a cooperation agreement in accordance
6. WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT, supra note 1.
7. WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT, supra note 1.
8. WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT, supra note 1.
9. Al Mahdi Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 6–7.
10. WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT, supra note 1.
11. Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, art. 8.2, Jul. 1, 2002, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9, available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-
0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/52Y8-RZZC]
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
12. Al Mahdi Arrest Warrant, supra note 3, at ¶ 6.
13. WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT, supra note 1; see also Case Information Sheet:
Situation in the Republic of Mali: The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al
Mahdi, INT’L CRIM. CT. (last updated Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/AlMahdiEng.pdf [https://perma.cc/S634-
2943] [hereinafter Case Information] (describing the expediency of the trial
proceedings).
14. Case Information, supra note 13.
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with Section IX of the Rome Statute.15 On September 18, 2015, the ICC
Pre-Trial Chamber I issued an arrest warrant against Al Mahdi.16 On
September 26, 2015, he was transferred to ICC authorities by the
government of Niger.17
Al Mahdi’s arrest caught many by surprise. While he was detained
in a prison in Niger, the ICC authorities issued a sealed warrant for his
arrest, sent representatives to meet with Niger government officials,
and transferred the defendant to the ICC detention facility at The
Hague.18 On March 24, 2016, charges against Al Mahdi, consisting of
war crimes constituted by attacks against religious and cultural sites,
were confirmed by Pre-Trial Chamber I.19 In addition to the ICC’s
charges against Al Mahdi, human rights groups accused Al Mahdi of
other crimes, and have encouraged the OTP to consider credible
allegations of Al Mahdi’s involvement in crimes committed against
civilians, including rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage.20 Al
Mahdi indicated that he would plead guilty on March 1, 2016; his trial
opened on August 22 and concluded within a single week.21 The court
sentenced Al Mahdi on September 27, 2016.22
While some have applauded the ICC prosecution of Al Mahdi as a
victory for the institution and as a ground breaking legal precedent,
others have criticized the court’s decision to go after a relatively little-
15. Case Information, supra note 13.
16. Al Mahdi Arrest Warrant, supra note 3.
17. WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT, supra note 1.
18. Mark Kersten, The al-Mahdi Case is a Breakthrough for the International
Criminal Court, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Aug. 25, 2016),
https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/08/25/the-al-mahdi-case-is-a-
breakthrough-for-the-international-criminal-court/ [https://perma.cc/25MT-
GFV5] [hereinafter Breakthrough].
19. WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT, supra note 1.
20. Mali: ICC trial over destruction of cultural property in Timbuktu shows need
for broader accountability, AMNESTY INT’L (Aug. 22, 2016),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/08/mali-icc-trial-over-
destruction-of-cultural-property-in-timbuktu-shows-need-for-broader-
accountability/ [https://perma.cc/27EX-GF8P] [hereinafter AMNESTY].
21. Questions and Answers: Situation in Mali: The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi
Al Mahdi, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/AlMahdiQA17August2016_Eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZX82-8J78].
22. The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, No. ICC-01/12-01/15-171,
Judgment and Sentence (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/record.aspx?docNo=ICC-01/12-01/15-171
[https://perma.cc/7WGA-3B2Z].
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known defendant, for a relatively insignificant crime.23 The two sections
below address these arguments.
II. Al Mahdi: A Big Victory for the ICC?
Commentators have applauded the Al Mahdi case and called it a
big victory for the ICC.24 This section will provide a brief summary of
the main arguments in favor of the Al Mahdi case as a victory for the
ICC.
First, Al-Mahdi’s trial was short and efficient, “which is important
for a court that has been hobbled by inexcusably long proceedings.”25
The ICC has a small budget, and completing an efficient trial without
expending many resources represents an important legal
accomplishment for the tribunal and will arguably free up the ICC to
pursue other cases and alleged criminals.26 Al Mahdi is the first ever
defendant in the ICC to plead guilty.27 From the start of his case, he
promised to cooperate with the ICC—in exchange, perhaps, for a
lenient sentence.28 Thus, prosecuting Al Mahdi, while knowing in
advance that the defendant would plead guilty and cooperate with
prosecutors, and also perhaps provide information about other future
cases, would appear to have been a particularly efficient use of the
ICC’s limited resources.
Second, the ICC has been perceived as a largely inefficient
institution, as cases against other alleged criminals have languished:
Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has been free since becoming
the first person charged by the ICC for genocide. Joseph Kony,
the notorious leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, continues to
wreak havoc in Central Africa, 10 years after being indicted. The
trials of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President
William Ruto collapsed as a result of a lethal combination of
shoddy case construction by ICC prosecutors and Kenyan
political interference.29
23. See AMNESTY, supra note 20 (noting that other crimes perpetrated in Mali,
including more violent crimes, have gone unpunished).
24. Mark Kersten, Some Thoughts on the al Mahdi Trial and Guilty Plea, JUSTICE
IN CONFLICT (Aug. 24, 2016), https://justiceinconflict.org/2016/08/24/some-
thoughts- on-the- al-mahdi- trial-and- guilty-plea/ [https://perma.cc/28EZ-
URXS] [hereinafter Some Thoughts].
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Breakthrough, supra note 18.
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Securing a conviction against an Islamic terrorist, such as Al
Mahdi, will send the right message that the ICC is efficient and capable
of arresting individuals and successfully completing trials within a
reasonable time period.
Third, Al-Mahdi’s surrender to the ICC was accomplished through
the cooperation of both Niger and Mali, two African states.30 This
cooperation may help the ICC to counter criticism of bias against the
African continent and the perception that African states are somehow
against the institution.31
Fourth, al-Mahdi’s evidence and testimony could be of use during
future prosecution; as mentioned above, he has proven to be more than
willing to cooperate with ICC investigators and prosecutors.32 Al Mahdi
may have been targeted by the ICC because of this promise, as the ICC
may have believed that al Mahdi’s cooperation and eventual testimony
would potentially help in bringing other perpetrators in Mali to
account.33 As one commentator observed, “[i]f al-Mahdi provides solid
testimony and evidence of other crimes, he could emerge as an
extremely useful resource not only for the ICC but for accountability
in Mali more generally.”34 This possibility may also help to alleviate the
skeptics’ concern that the ICC should not be focusing on the destruction
of property, but should instead focus on violence committed against
populations and individuals.35
Fifth, Al Mahdi’s conviction may bolster the court’s image as a
relevant institution seen as prosecuting crimes that shock the
conscience of mankind, such as the destruction of UNESCO sites.
Because of its limited jurisdictional reach, the ICC has been unable to
prosecute individuals responsible for the destruction of cultural sites in
places such as Palmyra or Bamiyan.36 Securing a conviction against an
individual accused of similar destruction in an ICC member state,
where the court does have jurisdiction, signals that the destruction of
cultural heritage is a war crime of legitimate concern to the
international community. In other words, “[t]he ICC showed that
30. Some Thoughts, supra note 24.
31. Some Thoughts, supra note 24.
32. Some Thoughts, supra note 24.
33. Some Thoughts, supra note 24.
34. Some Thoughts, supra note 24.
35. Some Thoughts, supra note 24.
36. Breakthrough, supra note 18; see also Some Thoughts, supra note 24 (noting
that because of limited jurisdictional reach, the ICC was unable to exert
authority in Syria and Afghanistan to punish (1) the destruction of cultural
relics in Palmyra by ISIS; and (2) Taliban violence against the Bamiyan
Buddhas).
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accountability for cultural crimes is possible.”37 The court’s action also
signaled other shifts:
Most crucially . . . , the court tapped into global outrage about
the destruction of cultural heritage sites. While the court has no
jurisdiction in Syria or Iraq, where Islamic State fighters have
wantonly obliterated historic sites, it could do something about
the destruction of Timbuktu shrines. In prosecuting Mr. al-
Mahdi, the ICC joined with UNESCO to form a new front line
against the violent destruction of culture.38
While many have pointed out the limitations of the Al Mahdi precedent
in terms of deterring future war criminals tempted to destroy other
cultural sites,39 the Al Mahdi case does demonstrate that the
international community cares about the protection of buildings and
monuments and is willing to expend focus and energy on this issue.
Sixth, the Al Mahdi case is a “first” of many kinds. This case marks
the first time that the destruction of cultural sites has been prosecuted
as a war crime at the ICC.40 It is also the first time that an Islamic
radical has been prosecuted at the ICC.41 Finally, it is the first time
that an ICC defendant has pleaded guilty.42
III. Al Mahdi: An Improper Use of ICC Resources?
Critics have pointed out that the case may not be such a welcome
development in international criminal law.43 For example, scholars have
criticized the Al Mahdi case as stretching the limits of the ICC “to a
breaking point” because the case fails to respect two core principles of
the ICC: gravity and complementarity.44
37. Breakthrough, supra note 18.
38. Breakthrough, supra note 18.
39. Some Thoughts, supra note 24.
40. Some Thoughts, supra note 24.
41. Some Thoughts, supra note 24.
42. Marieke de Hoon, The ICC’s Al Mahdi case is (also) a political trial, and
that’s fine!, EJIL: TALK! (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-iccs-al-
mahdi-case-is-also-a-political-prial-and-thats-fine/ [https://perma.cc/TJ82-
E4ZJ].
43. See, e.g., Eva Vogelvang & Sylvain Clerc, The Al Mahdi Case: Stretching the
Principles of the ICC to a Breaking Point?, JUSTICE HUB (Aug. 29, 2016),
https://justicehub.org/article/al-mahdi-case-stretching-principles-icc-
breaking-point [http://perma.cc/MD4J-49SW].
44. Id.
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A. Gravity
The ICC was established to exercise its jurisdiction over persons
for the most serious crimes of international concern.45 Article 17(1)(d)
of the Rome Statute provides that a case is inadmissible before the ICC
if the case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the
court.46 The Prosecutor has stated, in the context of the Al Mahdi case,
that “attacks against religious buildings are so grave that they warrant
action by the international community.”47 One has to wonder, however,
whether the destruction of buildings should qualify as one of the most
serious crimes of international concern. In another recent case, the so-
called Flotilla incident, where Israeli special forces killed ten activists
on board a vessel that had been about to breach the Israeli naval
blockade of Gaza, the ICC OTP held the case was not sufficiently grave
and the court would therefore not investigate.48 The OTP defined the
principle of gravity as:
(i) whether the individuals or groups of persons that are likely to
be the object of an investigation, include those who may bear the
greatest responsibility for the alleged crimes committed; and
(ii) the gravity of the crimes committed within the incidents
which are likely to be the focus of an investigation.49
Subsequently, the OTP defined the elements that are to be taken
into account when assessing the gravity of the crimes, namely, the
“scale, nature, manner of commission of the crimes and their impact.”50
The OTP weighed these considerations in the Flotilla case and
decided that the investigation should not proceed, because (1) it would
not be directed against those most responsible for the crime; (2) the
45. Rome Statute, supra note 11, at Preamble.
46. Rome Statute, supra note 11, at art. 17(1)(d) (providing that the court will
find a case inadmissible if it “is not of sufficient gravity to justify further
action by the Court”).
47. Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou
Bensouda, following the transfer of the first suspect in the Mali investigation:
“Intentional attacks against historic monuments and buildings dedicated to
religion are grave crimes”, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Sept. 26, 2015)
https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-26-09-2015
[https://perma.cc/882U-H5AS].
48. Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Situation on Registered
Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia: Article 53(1) Report,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ¶ 3 (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-com-article_53(1)-report-06nov2014eng.pdf
[http://perma.cc/YHY9-X3XY].
49. Id. at ¶ 135.
50. Id. at ¶ 135.
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scale and nature of the crimes were of insufficient gravity; and (3)
insufficient evidence was available to establish that the impact of the
crimes went beyond the direct victims.51
With this precedent in mind, it is important to address two
questions: whether Al Mahdi bears the greatest responsibility for the
alleged crimes, and whether the crimes themselves are of sufficient
gravity.
First, it is unclear whether Al Mahdi is indeed the most responsible
for the crimes. While it is likely that he had been involved in the
destruction of the religious buildings, it is equally likely that other
members of the Islamic groups were equally involved in the planning
and commission of these crimes.52 It has been suggested that Al Mahdi
is on trial because all of the other leaders of the various extremist militia
groups that operated in the region have been killed or otherwise
escaped.53 This suggestion would indicate that Al Mahdi was selected
for prosecution for pragmatic reasons, which had little to do with the
gravity principle.
Second, it is uncertain whether the war crime of destruction of
cultural property is grave enough to warrant prosecution in the ICC.
Despite the Rome Statute’s prohibitions against “the destruction of
religious buildings . . . , one must assume that the drafters envisaged
that these crimes would only be prosecuted once committed in
combination with other crimes that qualify as a war crime.”54 For
example, in the current trial of Bosco Ntaganda, the defendant is facing
twelve war crimes charges and five charges of crimes against humanity,
in addition to the destruction of cultural and religious property.55 Thus,
the Ntaganda case seems to pass the gravity threshold more easily than
the Al Mahdi case. Although the destruction of cultural and religious
buildings may constitute an attack on humanity as a whole, as recent
ISIS-perpetrated attacks on the cultural heritage of Syria may
demonstrate,56 this does not automatically lead to the conclusion that
the ICC should prosecute the perpetrators. The gravity threshold
imposes a limitation on the court: in light of its limited resources, the
51. Id. at ¶ 136.
52. Vogelvang & Clerc, supra note 43.
53. Vogelvang & Clerc, supra note 43.
54. Vogelvang & Clerc, supra note 43.
55. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Alleged Crimes, (Jun. 9, 2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/ntaganda/pages/alleged-crimes.aspx
[http://perma.cc/B2WB-WM88].
56. See Marina Lostal, Syria’s World Cultural Heritage and Individual Criminal
Responsibility, INT’L REV. L., 2015:3, at 1 (“Recent reports have confirmed
damage to five of the six Syrian world heritage sites during the current armed
conflict as well as extensive looting of several of its archaeological sites on the
Syrian Tentative List of world heritage.”).
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court should focus on the prosecution of those most responsible for
serious crimes.57 It may be argued that Al Mahdi’s alleged crimes are
not grave enough.
B. Complementarity
It is questionable whether the Al Mahdi prosecution satisfies the
principle of complementarity. The ICC is not supposed to interfere with
national prosecutions, and the court should only prosecute suspects if
a state is not able or willing to prosecute.58 According to Article 17(1)(a)
of the Rome Statute, a case is inadmissible when it is being investigated
or prosecuted by a state which has jurisdiction over it, unless the state
is genuinely unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation or
prosecution.59 In other words, if a state is able and willing to prosecute
an individual, that state should be given the opportunity to do so, and
the ICC should step away. Al Mahdi had already been indicted on
terrorism charges in Niger, before the ICC issued its arrest warrant.60
When Niger was informed that the ICC wanted to prosecute Al Mahdi,
Nigerois authorities transferred Al Mahdi and relinquished jurisdiction
over the case.61 Niger never stated that it was unwilling or unable to
prosecute Al Mahdi, and the ICC authorities themselves never bothered
with the complementarity issue.62 Thus, it seems that the ICC decision
to prosecute al Mahdi is contrary to the complementarity principle,
and, in light of the fact that the case may not pass the gravity
threshold, one has to wonder whether Al Mahdi’s prosecution should
have remained in the hands of Niger authorities.
IV. Conclusion
While the Al Mahdi case may be applauded as a precedent-setting
victory for the ICC as an institution and for international criminal law
in general, the case can also be criticized as an improper use of the
court and of its limited resources, to prosecute a lesser-known defendant
for relatively insignificant crimes. The case remains relevant, however,
for another reason: it demonstrates that the ICC may function properly
if cases are carefully selected and referring states actively cooperate in
57. MEGUMI OCHI, GRAVITY THRESHOLD BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 2–3 (2016).
58. INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 1.
59. Rome Statute, supra note 11, at art. 17(1)(a) (providing that the court will
find a case inadmissible if it “is being investigated or prosecuted by a State
which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely
to carry out the investigation or prosecution”).
60. Vogelvang & Clerc, supra note 43.
61. Vogelvang & Clerc, supra note 43.
62. Vogelvang & Clerc, supra note 43.
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the defendant’s arrest and prosecution. It may be better for the ICC to
pursue lesser-known defendants if the OTP determines that a
conviction can likely be secured with limited resources, than to issue
arrest warrants against defendants who are unlikely to find their way
to The Hague. Limited justice may be better than no justice at all.
